A Poem of Sappho (Refreshing my Greek)

Took up my old text book for Greek again, the Kantharos from Klett-Publishing House. And found the following small poem in the appendix:

Δέδυκε μὲν ἀ σελάννα
καὶ Πληίαδες· μέσαι δὲ
νύκτες, παρὰ δ’ ἔρχετ’ ὤρα,
ἔγω δὲ μόνα κατεύδω
(Fragm. adesp. 976 Page, 168b Voigt)

déduke: dúô-tr. / duomai intr.: sink, past indicative
érchetai: érchomai, come, go, deponens

Plato's Euthyphron (notes & reflections)

1) Several core conceptions of this short dialogue

τὸ ὅσιον: das Fromme / the pious (substantive form of the corresponding adjective)
τὸ θεοφιλὲς: das Gottesgeliebte / (the) loved by the gods (difficult to be expressed in English)
τὸ δίκαιον: das Gerechte / the just

2) the argumentative structure

Socrates asks Euthyphron to define the word 'pious': Λέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνὅσιον; (5d)

Socrates rejects an extensional definition of the 'pious' but insist to be told what the original form of the pious is, through which all pious actions are called 'pious'. He asks to know what the Idea 'ἰδέα' of pious ist (6e).

The first attempt of Euthyphron to define: τὸ ὅσιον=τὸ θεοφιλὲς (7a).
Socrates destructs this definition by telling him that the gods disagree and battle with each other, thus it is impossible to please all of them. What some gods hate is loved by the others, thus it is the same, according to this definition, to be pious and impious. Ad absurdum.

The second attempt: modification of this definition as "pious is what is loved by all gods" (9e).

Socrates shows, that both concepts "pious" and "loved by gods" are not synonym, because the pious is loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is love (1oe) - an (semantical) asymmetry.

Third attempt by using another concept: the just. What is just, is pious, a suggestion made by Socrates himself (12a), but the same Socrates shows that neither does this suffice, because what is pious, is just; but what is just, is not always pious (12d) - again an asymmetry. But if what is just contains what is pious, the pious should be able to be defined through restriction of the concept 'just'. Thus Socrates asks Euthyphron to tell what part of the just is pious (12e).

Fourth attempt: Euthyphron follows the suggestion of Socrates and restricts the pious to the service (θεραπεία) of gods (13a).

Socrates asks, if it is a service to gods, isn't it a kind of bargain with them? A bargain can't be pious because it bases upon mutual benificies. But what we do for gods can't be of use to them. What we receive from them is in opposite of great use to ourselves.

Euthyphron encounters that what we do as a service to gods is loved by them, but not useful to them, and so returns to his first attempt (15b).

A circle and seemly nothing achieved, but wait, he gives up his plan to sue his own old father.

3) reflections

What is specially interesting is the dialectical method which contains scrutinization of two opposite concepts (in this case the pious and the impious) and the semantical analysis of concepts (whether they are semantically equivalent or not). It reminds one of the Topics of Aristotle, where a similar method is applied. They say that Aristotle's Topics is still quite obliged to the Platonic Academy, no wonder then.

The Philosophy of Religion (a textbook by Friedo Ricken S.J.)

(Friedo Ricken: Religionsphilosophie, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003)

Father Ricken, professor at the College for Philosophy in Munich, an excellent Aristotelian indeed, whom I saw once during a lecture, published 2003 a textbook on the philosophy of religion. What strikes me most is that he begins with Wittgenstein, but criticizes in the preface the analytical approach of Richard Swinburne & Alvin Platinga, both offered a proof for the existence of God. He rejects both proofs as not sufficient. So what is specifically interesting with Wittgenstein, who is quoted in the first chapter to say:

Though I am not a religious person, but I can't otherwise: I see each problem from a religious point of view (m. translation, PR 121)?

The critique of Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics is used by Ricken to show that philosophy, other than Plantiga and Swineburne believe, can't prove the truth of religion. But the philosophy can enhance our conscientiousness of the basic religious phenomena in our everyday life. It can, thus Ricken, "uncover trails of religious reaction and symbolic in a secularized culture" (page 56). Philosophy shows the boundaries of language and reason, and that the room within these boundaries is too narrow to live in. In this way, philosophy can tell us to transcendent these bounds.

Then he mentions William James with his thesis of religion as a basic action, Peirce (The Marriage of Religion and Science), and Newman (An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent 1870)

After mentioning these modern philosophers, he writes about Schleiermacher, Kant, Hume and Pascal in the second half of his book, the standard authors of philosophy of religion, and ends with Thomas Aquinas, Augustin and Plotin!

Don't have time enough to read the book carefully, but the composition is quite strange. Why shall it end with Plotin? If the book doesn't have a chronological order, then it should have thematic circles. But I can discern none. And if the older authors come later in this book, they must be in the opinion of Father Ricken more insightful than the modern philosophers? But why Plotin, the philosophical mystic as the capstone? His philosophy is a kind of mysticism. Not that Plotin gives us some valuable insights into the nature of religion. His philosophy is a kind of religion, a religion without revelation, and relying solely on the capacity of human souls.

I am afraid that Father Ricken has a different notion of "philosophy of religion" than I. I understand under this term a rational description and explanation of religion, but he understands under this term a rational tool for religion. Well, in the old sense of Thomas: Philosophy as ancilla theologiae. But what else can you await from a Jesuit?

The Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus (as recorded by Epictetus)

In the Discourse by Epictetus:

The Master Argument seems to have been developed on the basis of the following sort of premisses. These three premisses form an incosistent triad: (1) Every past truth is necessary, and (2) The impossible does not follow from the possible, and (3) Something is possible which neither is true nor will be true. Diodorus, aware of this inconsistency, relied on the plausibility of the first two premisses in order to establish the conclusion that nothing is possible which neither is true nor will be true. But some maintain these two premisses: (3) Something is possible, which neither is nor will be true and (2) The impossible does not follow from the possible, but not (1) Every past truth is necessary. The supporters of Cleanthes seem to have taken this line, and they are mostly followed by Antipater. Others maintain the other two premisses, (3) Something is possible, which neither is nor will be true, and (1) Every past truth is necessary, and assert that the impossible does follow from the possible. It is impossible to maintain all three premisses owing to their mutual inconsistency. (Diss 2.19.1-4=fr.131 Döring=LS 38A).

Socrates: a man of Irony

I learned as a student of German Literature that the German Romanticism applies the method of irony, which is not to be understood as a rhetoric figure. Instead, it is a kind of philosophical method described once by Sören Kierkegaard. But silly me I forgot what exactly the description of Kierkegaard was and where he said this. Have to look up for it. But what occurs to me recently is, that this kind of irony is well documented in the Socratic dialogs of Plato. One place is the final part of Symposium, where Socrates remained awake together with Agathon, the winner of the contest for Tragic dramas, and Aristophanes, the winner of the contest for Comedy, and tried to persuade them that a good drama writer should be writing Tragedy and Comedy both at the same time.

And isn't it already an anticipation of the Tragic-Comedy of later eras? Lenz's Hofmeister is an example, written in the epoch of Sturm und Drang, which laid the foundations for the movement of Romanticism. Well, will be more careful while reading Plato. If I find more places indicating the "Socratic Irony", I will add them to this note.

Some Musings on the Development of the Post-Vatican II Theology (1)

It seems to me, that there are several changes which have taken place:

(1) the understanding of truth as a kind of dialog. Did it begin with Romano Guardini? The Revelation is conceived as a kind of Dialogue between God and Human being. And the relativism of human understanding seems to be designed to be embedded into this model, without giving up the idea that God is eternal and his Revelation is absolute truth. Is this model a successful one?

(2) Kant seems to be accepted by the theologians, who strive to integrate the transcendental philosophy into a new kind of theology. But together with Kant they criticise the metaphysics in Style of Descartes and Leibniz (i.e. Wolff), turning upon the Neoscholasticsm of the 19th. century, in oder to criticise its rigidness.
(to be continued)

Rediscovering Plato

Having read Plato some years ago, at that time still young, and an inexperienced student. But I never found him attractive, as a philosopher. Not that his ideas were unsympathetic to me, I could live in peace with his realm of ideas and his dualism of body and soul, but the argumentative style of his dialogs didn't appeal much to me. Instead, I was often nerved by it. As the argumentation is based on dialogs, instead of on a logical demonstration to which I prefer, as an less patient young woman. But now, while reading more of Greek literature, I discover something which I disregarded before: the Plato's dialogs, though containing his philosophy projects, are not to be read as philosophical tracts. Instead, they are poetical works with philosophical background. No wonder that he inspired in the Renaissance more poets and musicians than philosophers. His dialogs mirror also the living environments in Ancient Greece. It was not wondrous that I could at first so hard acquainted myself with his dialog. Aristotle's works are more universal and less dependent on culture backgrounds, because of the style they were written: most of them purely academical.

Well, now I win a new friend - Plato. Will start re-reading him soon. Have just read his Symposium again, find it beautiful.

A nice discovery.

Reading Lucian

The Penguin's Lucian (2004, translated by Prof. Keith Sidwell) is a nice treat. His translation is colloquial and idiomatic, and sparks one's desire to read Lucian in original. But how long will it take me to learn Greek so well that I can enjoy Lucian? One year? A wild dream. Until now I am still struggling with Plato's dialogs which I try to read with the help of a translation. Too long ago was my exam in Greek, and I didn't work hard enough to grasp it but only so much to pass the exam. Much work is needed.

A most inventive soul the Lucian was, and with a very vivid humour. Can't wait to read Wieland's translation as soon as I have time for it.